Regarding publications concerning the alleged training of Russian citizens and military personnel at the International Center for Special Training in Protection and Security near Gabrovo
In connection with an article published by the British newspaper The Telegraph on 9 September 2026 and its subsequent dissemination by media outlets and social networks in Bulgaria, Europe and Ukraine, MCSPTS Alfa-Metal Ltd considers it necessary to present its final official position.
The publication contains claims that former members of the British SAS and other Western special units were involved in training Russian citizens and serving Russian military personnel at private training centres in Europe, including at the Alfa-Metal facility near Gabrovo, with the implication that they were being prepared to take part in the war in Ukraine.
Alfa-Metal states categorically: these claims are not true with regard to our centre.
No Russian citizens have been trained at the centre since 2020
The Alfa-Metal International Center for Special Training in Protection and Security has operated since 2008 on the site of a former military airfield near the village of Mezhdeni, Gabrovo Municipality.
From the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 to the present day, no Russian citizens have been trained at the centre, and no training has been conducted for Russian organisations.
Alfa-Metal has never trained Russian military personnel or any other persons for the purpose of participating in the war against Ukraine. The courses and training programmes we conduct are primarily aimed at professional careers in protection and security in high-risk areas, maritime security, the protection of nature reserves and protected areas, VIP protection, the development and/or refresher training of skills, and other related fields.
This is not a claim that the public or the media should simply take at face value. The centre’s activities are licensed, documented and verifiable by the relevant Bulgarian state authorities.
Before foreign trainees are admitted, the necessary checks are carried out and the applicable procedures are followed. Participants’ data are processed and provided to the state authorities in accordance with the applicable legal procedures.
Visa and border controls for Russian citizens have been significantly strengthened since 2022
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the travel regime for citizens of the Russian Federation travelling to the European Union was substantially changed. In September 2022, the EU fully suspended the visa facilitation agreement with Russia, and applications by Russian citizens became subject to more thorough scrutiny and enhanced controls.
Controls do not end with the issue of a visa. The entry and residence of third-country nationals are subject to European and national border and migration control mechanisms.
Therefore, the claim that serving Russian military personnel can systematically and without hindrance travel to Bulgaria and secretly undergo specialised military training at a licensed centre does not concern Alfa-Metal alone. Such a claim effectively calls into question the effectiveness of the entire system of European and Bulgarian procedures and institutions.
Precisely because of the seriousness of such an allegation, it must be supported by verifiable facts, not merely by anonymous information and assumptions.
What The Telegraph itself actually acknowledges
The publication refers to a leaked intelligence assessment compiled on the basis of information from individuals linked to the Australian special forces.
A material fact is that The Telegraph itself expressly states that it was unable to independently verify the claims contained in that document. This circumstance, however, is given significantly less prominence than the categorical implication created by the headline and the opening of the article.
Even before publication, Alfa-Metal provided the journalist with detailed written responses and categorically rejected the allegations.
Moreover, we invited representatives of The Telegraph to visit the centre in person, to familiarise themselves with the facility, its activities, instructors and the organisation of the training, and to verify the claims through official channels with the Bulgarian state authorities.
- This opportunity was not taken.
- Our position then and now is the same:
We do not ask anyone to take our word for it. We ask that the facts be verified.
Ukrainian citizens and possible misidentification
There is another material circumstance.
In 2024 — the period to which the information concerning the visit of an Australian citizen to the facility also relates — Ukrainian citizens were undergoing training at Alfa-Metal, some of whom were Russian-speaking. The group consisted mainly of veterans with varying degrees of disability who were undergoing retraining with the aim of entering civilian employment.
For this reason, it is entirely possible that a person who was at the facility only briefly and heard Russian being spoken may have reached an incorrect conclusion about the trainees’ nationality.
We are not claiming that this was necessarily the source of the information in the cited intelligence document. We point to it as a specific, logical and verifiable circumstance that should be taken into account.
Our trainees’ documents contain protected personal data and will not be made available publicly or to the media. The necessary information is available and can be verified by the competent Bulgarian state authorities.
It is also important to distinguish the relevant time periods: the circumstances described relate to 2024, whereas the September 2026 publication, through its use of the present tense, creates the impression of activity that is taking place now.
Regarding the SAS and instructor job advertisements
Alfa-Metal does not conceal the fact that it seeks highly qualified instructors with professional experience in various specialised organisations around the world.
We have also published advertisements seeking candidates with experience and an SIA licence. That is a fact.
But a job advertisement is not evidence that a particular candidate was hired, still less that such a person trained Russian citizens.
At present, Alfa-Metal has no instructors who are serving or former members of the SAS or the British Armed Forces.
The professional context of the advertisements is also material. They are aimed at specialists with qualifications and experience in Close Protection and related areas of protective training — including personal protection, protective operations and work in various high-risk environments.
Isolating the description “SAS Instructor” from the full context of the required qualifications creates an implication that the advertisement itself does not substantiate.
Alfa-Metal works with instructors from different countries. Our current instructors include Ukrainian citizens.
Regarding Alfa Region and our historical international contacts
We do not deny our history.
Before 2020, Alfa-Metal, like countless European and other international companies, maintained professional contacts with companies and organisations in Russia, as well as with organisations and specialists from the United States, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and a number of other countries.
This formed part of the international exchange of professional experience, different schools of thought, methodologies and approaches in the fields of security, protection and counter-terrorism.
For an international training centre, such an exchange of knowledge has been and remains an important professional and competitive advantage.
Since 2020, Alfa-Metal has maintained no professional relations with Russian organisations.
The fact that the Alfa Region website continues to contain old information about relations or cooperation dating from before that period is beyond our control and does not constitute evidence of an existing partnership in 2026.
We consider it misleading to present historical materials without the necessary temporal context in a manner that creates the impression of current relations.
A clear distinction must also be made between the different legal entities that have borne similar names. Alfa-Metal OOD, a company in which a Russian citizen was involved in the past, ceased operations in 2014 and should not be equated with the current activities of MCSPTS Alfa-Metal Ltd.
Bulgarian institutions also responded
The publications generated political and public reaction in Bulgaria and led to calls for investigations and hearings involving the heads of the security services.
This in itself demonstrates how serious the consequences of such a claim are.
Following the dissemination of the claim, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria publicly described the media reports concerning the alleged training of Russian military personnel near Gabrovo as “absolute speculation”.
Bulgarian National Radio also drew attention to the significant discrepancy between the categorical nature of the headline and the content of the British publication: beyond the headline, it is not established that the Russians in question were going to fight in Ukraine, while the newspaper itself acknowledges that it was unable to independently verify the claims.
From an unverified claim to an “established fact”
We are particularly concerned by the way in which the information changes as it is subsequently republished.
Claims initially presented as information from external sources, an alleged intelligence document or unverified data gradually began to be reproduced by other media outlets and on social networks as established facts.
Repeated republication of a claim does not turn it into evidence.
In some of the subsequent publications, even The Telegraph’s original qualification that the information had not been independently verified disappeared. As a result, an international media effect was created in which each subsequent publication referred to the preceding one, while the original unverified source gradually receded into the background.
The consequences no longer affect Alfa-Metal alone. Public reactions have also included negative implications concerning Bulgaria as a state, its institutions and their ability to exercise control over activities taking place on the territory of a Member State of the European Union and NATO.
We consider this particularly serious.
Our final position
Alfa-Metal categorically rejects the claim that, since 2020, it has trained Russian citizens, Russian military personnel or persons being prepared to participate in the war against Ukraine.
We will not engage in political interpretations and will not speculate about the motives of journalists, sources or third parties.
We will adhere to verifiable facts.
Our activities are licensed and documented. Our trainees undergo the necessary procedures. Foreign nationals are subject to the applicable visa, border and migration regime. The competent Bulgarian authorities have the mechanisms to verify the claims through official procedures.
Alfa-Metal is ready to cooperate with any competent Bulgarian institution in carrying out such a verification.
The invitation extended to The Telegraph to visit the centre remains open to other professional media outlets that genuinely wish to verify the facts, subject to compliance with legal requirements, the protection of trainees’ personal data and the necessary professional confidentiality.
In connection with the publication, Alfa-Metal has also taken formal action through the established procedures to protect its reputation and to seek correction of the information disseminated publicly.
Our message is clear:
Do not take our position on trust. Do not take the allegations on trust either. Verify the facts.
Alfa-Metal EOOD
International Center for Special Training in Protection and Security Gabrovo, Bulgaria
